--- title: "Who Could Replace Iran's Ayatollah? The Contenders to Lead Tehran" description: "Sixty seconds. That was all the time it took for Israel to carry out one of the most complex missions in recent history. When it was over, eight members of Iran's top leadership lay dead, including the nation's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei. The strike itself was brief, but it was the culmination of decades of painstaking intelligence work by Israel's secret services, an effort that had accelerated over the previous six months with help from the CIA and other American agencies.\n\nThe agency had reportedly tracked Khamenei's movements for months, mapping his patterns and locations. When intelligence indicated he would be at a leadership compound in the heart of Tehran for a meeting, that information was passed to Israel. The window prompted Israel and Washington to move up the timing of strikes that had originally been planned for the cover of darkness. After that, eliminating a man who had been a thorn in Israel's side for decades took roughly a minute.\n\nThe operation was a testament to the reach of American and Israeli intelligence. Yet some analysts and intelligence veterans have criticized it as a strategic error, one that could alienate potential supporters inside Iran or clear a path for someone even more radical. Israeli analyst Yossi Melman put it bluntly to the Guardian: \"The problem is that Israel is in love with assassinations … and we never learn that it is not the solution. We have killed all the leaders of Hamas. They are still there. It's the same with Hezbollah. The leaders are always replaced.\"\n\nThat observation raises the central question now hanging over Iran: with the Ayatollah dead, who replaces him, and what kind of country will the successor inherit? This is a portrait of the contenders, the constitutional machinery that will choose among them, and the open question of whether the Islamic Republic survives the crisis at all.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n\n- Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in a coordinated American-Israeli strike in Tehran, and power has passed to a constitutionally mandated interim leadership council while a successor is chosen.\n- The interim council comprises President Masoud Pezeshkian, judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje'i, and senior cleric Alireza Arafi; Pezeshkian cannot become Supreme Leader because he is not a cleric.\n- The successor must, by law, be selected by the 88-member Assembly of Experts, but convening that body during an active war is risky because it would be an obvious target.\n- Leading contenders include Khamenei's son Mojtaba, Hassan Khomeini, former president Hassan Rouhani, hardliner Mohammad Mehdi Mirbagheri, and the two clerics on the interim council.\n- A US assessment reportedly identified Ali Larijani, head of the Supreme National Security Council, as effectively running Iran since the January protests, though he cannot formally hold the post because he is not a cleric.\n- His brother, cleric Sadiq Larijani, could supply the clerical legitimacy, creating a potential power-sharing arrangement, though corruption allegations have weakened his standing.\n- Public celebrations of Khamenei's death and a fractured population leave it an open question whether the regime endures, even as roughly 40 percent of Iranians still back it.\n\n## The Constitutional Machinery of Succession\n\nUnder the Iranian constitution, if the Supreme Leader is unable to perform his functions, authority transfers to an interim leadership council. That is precisely what followed the Ayatollah's death on Saturday. The council is currently composed of the president, Masoud Pezeshkian; the head of the judiciary, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje'i; and a senior cleric from the Guardian Council, Alireza Arafi. These three will hold the post until a new leader is selected, a process that could stretch on for some time.\n\nThe obstacles are formidable. Electing a new Supreme Leader during a war is difficult enough, but the body responsible for the choice complicates matters further. Even the most logical candidate must be confirmed by the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member clerical body that Iranians elect every eight years. With the nation at war, gathering that assembly in one place is a hazardous proposition: a concentrated cluster of the regime's senior clergy would present an obvious target for Washington and Israel. The very mechanism designed to ensure orderly succession has become a liability in wartime.\n\n## Why a Hardliner Made the Most Sense\n\nShortly before Khamenei's death, the CIA reportedly concluded that, if he were assassinated, he might be replaced by a hardline figure from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The IRGC is the elite armed force that operates alongside Iran's regular army but answers directly to the Supreme Leader, and from Tehran's vantage point, that logic holds.\n\nThe killing of a man who had ruled Iran for 36 years is an existential shock to the regime. Appointing a hardliner would be the clearest signal that the system intends to survive. Hardliners exist across every branch of Iran's government, but the IRGC is distinct: its doctrine is built on protecting the Islamic revolution, and its members are prepared to go to extreme lengths to defend it. As Kasra Aarabi, an expert on the IRGC, wrote in Engelsberg Ideas, the Guard sees the United States as the embodiment of evil, holding that the Islamic Republic's success depends on America's defeat. By that reasoning, a hardliner drawn from the Guard's ranks would be the natural choice, even if the formalities of selection still run through the Assembly of Experts.\n\n## The Family Names: Mojtaba Khamenei and Hassan Khomeini\n\nThe first name in contention is Mojtaba Khamenei, widely regarded as the most influential of the late leader's sons. A mid-ranking cleric believed to control vast financial assets and to wield significant power behind the scenes, he rose to national prominence in 2009. According to the Atlantic Council, he orchestrated the electoral fraud that secured a second term for then-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and managed the crackdown on the post-election protests known as the Green Movement. He took control of the street militias known as basiji and unleashed a wave of repression echoed years later in the January 2026 protests.\n\nThose tactics, the Guardian reported, rubbed many of Iran's senior clerics, conservative politicians, and Revolutionary Guard generals the wrong way. A politician close to the security apparatus told the outlet that officials were unwilling to challenge the Khameneis openly, fearing it would weaken the nation. Mojtaba's deepest problem, though, is not an old feud. It is his last name. Professor Muhammad Sahimi notes that nepotism was a central grievance against the Pahlavi dynasty, and Iranians hoped the 1979 revolution would eliminate or curb it. Elevating a mid-level cleric who has not even earned the title of Ayatollah risks reviving those resentments among an already restless population.\n\nThe second dynastic option, Hassan Khomeini, would face similar accusations of nepotism. Reuters described him as the most visible of the 15 grandchildren of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founding figure of post-revolutionary Iran. Hassan is viewed as a relative moderate within the clerical establishment, with \"relative\" doing considerable work. He enjoys close ties to reformists, including former presidents Mohammed Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, both of whom pursued engagement with the West while in office.\n\nKhomeini has a record of urging reform and occasionally voicing dissent, including demands for accountability over the death of Mahsa Amini, the young woman who died in 2022 after being detained by morality police. Such gestures have led some Tehran politicians to see him as a rival to the hardliners who gained ground under Khamenei, notably Mojtaba. Yet Hassan has never served in government, holding instead the symbolically weighty role of custodian of his grandfather's mausoleum in southern Tehran. At a moment when Iran needs stable, experienced leadership, that lack of governing experience matters. Like Mojtaba, he has not been granted the title of Ayatollah, a deficiency his detractors will not let pass quietly.\n\n## The Pragmatist and the Purist\n\nSomeone who genuinely does carry leadership experience is Hassan Khomeini's ally, former president Hassan Rouhani. A relative moderate, Rouhani served from 2013 to 2021 and reached the landmark nuclear agreement with the Obama administration, the deal Trump scrapped during his first term. Rouhani sat on the Assembly of Experts until 2024, when, he said, he was disqualified from seeking reelection, a move he condemned as an infringement on Iranians' political participation.\n\nThat disqualification casts doubt on whether the regime would seriously entertain him as a successor, especially since the Guardian Council, which vets candidates, has already barred him from the very Assembly that would elect the next leader. Still, Rouhani's administrative record, diplomatic credentials, and history of engaging the West could make him appealing to a regime hunting for someone capable of negotiating an off-ramp from the crisis with Washington. In a moment defined by war, a proven negotiator carries a particular kind of value.\n\nAt the opposite end of the spectrum sits Ayatollah Mohammad Mehdi Mirbagheri, a senior cleric on the Assembly of Experts who is popular with hardliners. Among his admirers was the late Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, who argued that Iran should not deny itself the right to produce \"special weapons,\" a thinly veiled reference to nuclear arms. Mirbagheri's theology aligns with ultra-conservative readings of Islamic law, and he heads the Islamic Cultural Center in Qom, the country's principal hub of Islamic teaching. His elevation would announce a regime committed to ideological purity over pragmatism, and would likely lock in Iran's confrontational posture toward the West for the foreseeable future.\n\n## The Clerics on the Council\n\nBecause the interim council may govern for an extended period, its members enjoy a rare chance to strengthen their credentials and persuade both the Assembly of Experts and the Iranian public that they deserve the top job. President Masoud Pezeshkian, though among the most powerful figures in the country, does not qualify: he is not a cleric. That narrows the field on the council to two men, Ayatollah Alireza Arafi and Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje'i.\n\nArafi is, in essence, a bureaucrat whose entire career, according to the Middle East Institute, was shaped by appointments Khamenei entrusted to him. From 2008 to 2018 he served as president of Al-Mustafa International University, founded by Khamenei to export the regime's ideology abroad. A rapid sequence of promotions followed: in 2016 he became head of all seminaries nationwide, in 2019 he was handpicked for the Guardian Council, and in 2022 he joined the Assembly of Experts. The Indian outlet The Week described him as a tech-savvy, second-generation hardliner with the right family connections. His appointment, perhaps more than any other candidate's, would signal pure continuity with Khamenei's system.\n\nMohseni-Eje'i is more complicated. He studied at the Haqqani School in Qom, a seminary renowned for producing many of Iran's leading hardline clerics, and one of his teachers was Mesbah Yazdi, the same ultra-conservative theologian who mentored Mirbagheri. His career has been defined by a willingness to use violence in defense of the regime. Yet according to Iran International, since becoming chief justice in 2021 he has gradually distanced himself from Tehran's ultra-hardliners and cultivated a relatively cooperative relationship with Pezeshkian's moderate administration, drawing sharp criticism from purists who view him as going soft. If chosen, he would signal a regime prepared to be pragmatic in the name of survival.\n\n## The Larijani Brothers and the De Facto Question\n\nEven with this roster of contenders, the man who ends up wielding the most power in Iran could be a dark horse. The CIA assessment that flagged a possible IRGC successor reportedly identified another candidate: Ali Larijani, a former commander in the Revolutionary Guards Corps and the current head of the Supreme National Security Council. According to the New York Times, Larijani has effectively been running Iran since the January protests. He directed the lethal crackdown on demonstrators demanding an end to Islamic rule.\n\nHis portfolio extended further: suppressing dissent, including the arrest of prominent reformist politicians; managing relationships with powerful allies like Russia and regional players like Qatar and Oman; and overseeing nuclear negotiations with Washington. The Times reported he was also drawing up plans to manage Iran through a potential war with the United States, a role that had effectively sidelined President Pezeshkian. In the aftermath of the strikes, Larijani has been among the most visible figures, appearing on state television within hours of Khamenei's confirmed death with a fiery message: \"We will burn their hearts. We will make … the shameless Americans regret their actions.\"\n\nThe powers Larijani holds make him almost a de facto Supreme Leader. But \"de facto\" is likely where it stays, because he is not a cleric, and the constitution requires that the leader be one. The document has been amended before to suit political realities, yet stripping out the clerical requirement would be a bridge too far for a regime whose entire legitimacy rests on the principle of clerical rule.\n\nThat is where his brother enters the picture. Sadiq Larijani is a cleric with deep government experience, currently serving as chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council and previously as chief justice. A former close aide to Khamenei, he has long been viewed as a potential successor. According to United Against Nuclear Iran, corruption allegations that trailed the end of his judicial career, together with the broader marginalization of the Larijani dynasty, have dented his standing. Even so, the fact that his brother climbed to one of the country's most powerful posts despite that marginalization suggests Sadiq's elevation is not unthinkable.\n\nA Sadiq appointment would produce an unusual complementarity. Sadiq would supply the clerical credentials, while Ali would bring the security-apparatus connections, the pragmatic diplomatic experience, and the relationships with Russia and China that Tehran badly needs as it confronts Washington and Jerusalem. In effect, it would formalize an arrangement that has existed since January, when Ali Larijani began running the country in all but name. Still, all of this is prediction. No one yet knows who will emerge victorious, and the winner could just as easily be someone not yet on anyone's list. Iran is in flux, and with thousands dead from the January protests and the country reeling from American and Israeli strikes, it remains an open question whether the regime survives at all.\n\n## Regime Survival in a Time of War\n\nWhoever inherits the mantle of Supreme Leader faces an unenviable task. They must lead the country through a war with Israel and the United States while carrying a target on their back. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently insisted this is not a regime-change war, a claim complicated by the fact that the operation killed the man running the regime. President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, by contrast, have made their goal plain: during the announcement of the strikes, they urged the Iranian people to take control of their government. If regime change remains the objective, any new Supreme Leader could find himself in American crosshairs sooner rather than later.\n\nThere is also the possibility that ordinary Iranians act on that encouragement and attempt to topple the government themselves. What makes this plausible is the public reaction to Khamenei's death. Despite Tehran's efforts to discourage open celebration, residents across multiple cities reportedly took to the streets in jubilation. Sources told Iran International that people were shouting in celebration. Farzad, a Tehran resident, described whistling and the honking of motorcycles and cars filling the air: \"It just erupted all at once.\" Tehran is the city where state surveillance is strongest. If people are willing to celebrate that openly in the capital, the scenes in cities with weaker government control may be even more striking.\n\nPublic celebration, however, is not necessarily fatal to the regime. As Rockford Weitz, a professor at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, observed in an interview with HomeFronts, roughly 40 percent of the nation still supports the system. Thousands turned out to mourn the Ayatollah not only in Tehran but in cities including Shiraz, Yasuj, and Lorestan. Seizing on those numbers, the government declared 40 days of mourning, a move analysts at Open Magazine called a \"funeral trap\" designed to make it logistically and morally difficult for anti-government protests to build momentum in the near term.\n\nThe dangers are not only from the street. Whoever is chosen will likely face assassination attempts if he is seen offering too many concessions to the West. Hardliners within the Revolutionary Guards and the clerical establishment would treat such moves as betrayal, given that the regime has built its identity on resistance to America and Israel. And yet the next Supreme Leader will almost certainly have to strike some deal with Washington if the regime is to endure. Iran can exact a serious toll on American bases and allies across the Middle East, but it cannot withstand the combined might of the United States and Israel indefinitely. The successor, whoever he turns out to be, will be squeezed between the hardliners who demand defiance and the strategic reality that makes defiance unsustainable.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n**What happens to Iran's leadership immediately after the Supreme Leader's death?**\nUnder the constitution, when the Supreme Leader cannot perform his functions, power passes to an interim leadership council. That council now consists of President Masoud Pezeshkian, judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje'i, and senior cleric Alireza Arafi, who will govern until a successor is chosen.\n\n**Who formally selects the next Supreme Leader?**\nThe choice falls to the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member clerical body elected by the public every eight years. The complication is that convening the assembly during an active war is dangerous, because a gathering of the regime's senior clergy would be an obvious target for the United States and Israel.\n\n**Why can't President Pezeshkian become Supreme Leader?**\nAlthough Pezeshkian is one of the most powerful figures in the country and sits on the interim council, he is not a cleric. The constitution requires the Supreme Leader to be a cleric, which disqualifies him from the role.\n\n**Why is Ali Larijani considered so powerful if he can't become Supreme Leader?**\nAs head of the Supreme National Security Council, Larijani has effectively run Iran since the January protests, overseeing the crackdown on dissent, relations with Russia and other allies, and nuclear negotiations with Washington. His authority makes him a de facto leader, but because he is not a cleric, he cannot formally take the title. His brother Sadiq, a cleric, could provide the clerical credentials in a complementary arrangement.\n\n**What is the significance of candidates not holding the title of Ayatollah?**\nSeveral contenders, including Mojtaba Khamenei and Hassan Khomeini, are mid-ranking clerics who have not attained the rank of Ayatollah. Their detractors are expected to use that against them, since the position of Supreme Leader carries immense theological weight and rivals will question the religious standing of anyone short of that rank.\n\n**How has the Iranian public reacted to Khamenei's death?**\nReports from multiple cities described open celebration despite government efforts to discourage it, with residents in Tehran shouting, whistling, and honking horns. At the same time, roughly 40 percent of the nation still supports the regime, and thousands mourned the Ayatollah in cities such as Shiraz, Yasuj, and Lorestan.\n\n**Could the regime collapse altogether?**\nIt is an open question. The country is reeling from American and Israeli strikes and thousands of deaths from the January protests, and Trump and Netanyahu have openly called for the people to overthrow the government. Still, the regime retains substantial support and has tools, such as the 40-day mourning period, to blunt unrest, so survival remains plausible even amid the crisis.\n\n## Sources\n\n- [The Conversation: Trump and Netanyahu want regime change, but Iran's regime was built for survival](https://theconversation.com/trump-and-netanyahu-want-regime-change-but-irans-regime-was-built-for-survival-a-long-war-is-now-likely-277193)\n- [CNN: Pete Hegseth on the Pentagon and Iran strikes](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/02/world/video/pete-hegseth-pentagon-iran-strikes-digvid)\n- [Archive: archive.is/JMSQP](https://archive.is/JMSQP)\n- [Open Magazine: The funeral trap — how Iran is weaponising 40 days of mourning](https://openthemagazine.com/world/the-funeral-trap-how-iran-is-weaponising-40-days-of-mourning)\n- [Iran International](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602288551)\n- [Al Jazeera: Iran begins 40-day mourning after Khamenei killed in US-Israeli attack](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/1/iran-begins-40-day-mourning-after-khamenei-killed-in-us-israeli-attack)\n- [Archive: archive.is/pIefY](https://archive.is/pIefY)\n- [Washington Post: Iran, Israel, US war — Khamenei successor and the supreme leader question](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2026/03/02/iran-israel-us-war-khamenei-successor-supreme-leader/d4c9e20e-1644-11f1-aef0-0aac8e8e94db_story.html)\n- [The Hill: Larijani, Trump, and the Iran conflict](https://thehill.com/policy/international/5763740-larijani-trump-iran-conflict/)\n- [The Conversation: Despite massive US attack and death of Ayatollah, regime change in Iran is unlikely](https://theconversation.com/despite-massive-us-attack-and-death-of-ayatollah-regime-change-in-iran-is-unlikely-277180)\n\n" url: https://homefronts.pub/article/who-could-replace-the-ayatollah.md canonical: https://homefronts.pub/article/who-could-replace-the-ayatollah datePublished: 2026-06-03 dateModified: 2026-06-03 author: - name: Simon Whistler url: https://homefronts.pub/author/simon-whistler publisher: HomeFronts image: "https://media.homefronts.pub/cdn-cgi/image/width=1600,height=900,fit=cover,quality=80,format=auto/articles/dKYr7aTOqGc/hero.jpg" type: Article contentHash: dad9bfe3b826de158d30e14656b04e8a5f4403f9d0a3653791eaf2dda6c775b0 tokens: 5604 summaryUrl: https://homefronts.pub/article/who-could-replace-the-ayatollah.md.summary.md --- Sixty seconds. That was all the time it took for Israel to carry out one of the most complex missions in recent history. When it was over, eight members of Iran's top leadership lay dead, including the nation's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei. The strike itself was brief, but it was the culmination of decades of painstaking intelligence work by Israel's secret services, an effort that had accelerated over the previous six months with help from the CIA and other American agencies. The agency had reportedly tracked Khamenei's movements for months, mapping his patterns and locations. When intelligence indicated he would be at a leadership compound in the heart of Tehran for a meeting, that information was passed to Israel. The window prompted Israel and Washington to move up the timing of strikes that had originally been planned for the cover of darkness. After that, eliminating a man who had been a thorn in Israel's side for decades took roughly a minute. The operation was a testament to the reach of American and Israeli intelligence. Yet some analysts and intelligence veterans have criticized it as a strategic error, one that could alienate potential supporters inside Iran or clear a path for someone even more radical. Israeli analyst Yossi Melman put it bluntly to the Guardian: "The problem is that Israel is in love with assassinations … and we never learn that it is not the solution. We have killed all the leaders of Hamas. They are still there. It's the same with Hezbollah. The leaders are always replaced." That observation raises the central question now hanging over Iran: with the Ayatollah dead, who replaces him, and what kind of country will the successor inherit? This is a portrait of the contenders, the constitutional machinery that will choose among them, and the open question of whether the Islamic Republic survives the crisis at all. ## Key Takeaways - Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in a coordinated American-Israeli strike in Tehran, and power has passed to a constitutionally mandated interim leadership council while a successor is chosen. - The interim council comprises President Masoud Pezeshkian, judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje'i, and senior cleric Alireza Arafi; Pezeshkian cannot become Supreme Leader because he is not a cleric. - The successor must, by law, be selected by the 88-member Assembly of Experts, but convening that body during an active war is risky because it would be an obvious target. - Leading contenders include Khamenei's son Mojtaba, Hassan Khomeini, former president Hassan Rouhani, hardliner Mohammad Mehdi Mirbagheri, and the two clerics on the interim council. - A US assessment reportedly identified Ali Larijani, head of the Supreme National Security Council, as effectively running Iran since the January protests, though he cannot formally hold the post because he is not a cleric. - His brother, cleric Sadiq Larijani, could supply the clerical legitimacy, creating a potential power-sharing arrangement, though corruption allegations have weakened his standing. - Public celebrations of Khamenei's death and a fractured population leave it an open question whether the regime endures, even as roughly 40 percent of Iranians still back it. ## The Constitutional Machinery of Succession Under the Iranian constitution, if the Supreme Leader is unable to perform his functions, authority transfers to an interim leadership council. That is precisely what followed the Ayatollah's death on Saturday. The council is currently composed of the president, Masoud Pezeshkian; the head of the judiciary, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje'i; and a senior cleric from the Guardian Council, Alireza Arafi. These three will hold the post until a new leader is selected, a process that could stretch on for some time. The obstacles are formidable. Electing a new Supreme Leader during a war is difficult enough, but the body responsible for the choice complicates matters further. Even the most logical candidate must be confirmed by the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member clerical body that Iranians elect every eight years. With the nation at war, gathering that assembly in one place is a hazardous proposition: a concentrated cluster of the regime's senior clergy would present an obvious target for Washington and Israel. The very mechanism designed to ensure orderly succession has become a liability in wartime. ## Why a Hardliner Made the Most Sense Shortly before Khamenei's death, the CIA reportedly concluded that, if he were assassinated, he might be replaced by a hardline figure from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The IRGC is the elite armed force that operates alongside Iran's regular army but answers directly to the Supreme Leader, and from Tehran's vantage point, that logic holds. The killing of a man who had ruled Iran for 36 years is an existential shock to the regime. Appointing a hardliner would be the clearest signal that the system intends to survive. Hardliners exist across every branch of Iran's government, but the IRGC is distinct: its doctrine is built on protecting the Islamic revolution, and its members are prepared to go to extreme lengths to defend it. As Kasra Aarabi, an expert on the IRGC, wrote in Engelsberg Ideas, the Guard sees the United States as the embodiment of evil, holding that the Islamic Republic's success depends on America's defeat. By that reasoning, a hardliner drawn from the Guard's ranks would be the natural choice, even if the formalities of selection still run through the Assembly of Experts. ## The Family Names: Mojtaba Khamenei and Hassan Khomeini The first name in contention is Mojtaba Khamenei, widely regarded as the most influential of the late leader's sons. A mid-ranking cleric believed to control vast financial assets and to wield significant power behind the scenes, he rose to national prominence in 2009. According to the Atlantic Council, he orchestrated the electoral fraud that secured a second term for then-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and managed the crackdown on the post-election protests known as the Green Movement. He took control of the street militias known as basiji and unleashed a wave of repression echoed years later in the January 2026 protests. Those tactics, the Guardian reported, rubbed many of Iran's senior clerics, conservative politicians, and Revolutionary Guard generals the wrong way. A politician close to the security apparatus told the outlet that officials were unwilling to challenge the Khameneis openly, fearing it would weaken the nation. Mojtaba's deepest problem, though, is not an old feud. It is his last name. Professor Muhammad Sahimi notes that nepotism was a central grievance against the Pahlavi dynasty, and Iranians hoped the 1979 revolution would eliminate or curb it. Elevating a mid-level cleric who has not even earned the title of Ayatollah risks reviving those resentments among an already restless population. The second dynastic option, Hassan Khomeini, would face similar accusations of nepotism. Reuters described him as the most visible of the 15 grandchildren of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founding figure of post-revolutionary Iran. Hassan is viewed as a relative moderate within the clerical establishment, with "relative" doing considerable work. He enjoys close ties to reformists, including former presidents Mohammed Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, both of whom pursued engagement with the West while in office. Khomeini has a record of urging reform and occasionally voicing dissent, including demands for accountability over the death of Mahsa Amini, the young woman who died in 2022 after being detained by morality police. Such gestures have led some Tehran politicians to see him as a rival to the hardliners who gained ground under Khamenei, notably Mojtaba. Yet Hassan has never served in government, holding instead the symbolically weighty role of custodian of his grandfather's mausoleum in southern Tehran. At a moment when Iran needs stable, experienced leadership, that lack of governing experience matters. Like Mojtaba, he has not been granted the title of Ayatollah, a deficiency his detractors will not let pass quietly. ## The Pragmatist and the Purist Someone who genuinely does carry leadership experience is Hassan Khomeini's ally, former president Hassan Rouhani. A relative moderate, Rouhani served from 2013 to 2021 and reached the landmark nuclear agreement with the Obama administration, the deal Trump scrapped during his first term. Rouhani sat on the Assembly of Experts until 2024, when, he said, he was disqualified from seeking reelection, a move he condemned as an infringement on Iranians' political participation. That disqualification casts doubt on whether the regime would seriously entertain him as a successor, especially since the Guardian Council, which vets candidates, has already barred him from the very Assembly that would elect the next leader. Still, Rouhani's administrative record, diplomatic credentials, and history of engaging the West could make him appealing to a regime hunting for someone capable of negotiating an off-ramp from the crisis with Washington. In a moment defined by war, a proven negotiator carries a particular kind of value. At the opposite end of the spectrum sits Ayatollah Mohammad Mehdi Mirbagheri, a senior cleric on the Assembly of Experts who is popular with hardliners. Among his admirers was the late Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, who argued that Iran should not deny itself the right to produce "special weapons," a thinly veiled reference to nuclear arms. Mirbagheri's theology aligns with ultra-conservative readings of Islamic law, and he heads the Islamic Cultural Center in Qom, the country's principal hub of Islamic teaching. His elevation would announce a regime committed to ideological purity over pragmatism, and would likely lock in Iran's confrontational posture toward the West for the foreseeable future. ## The Clerics on the Council Because the interim council may govern for an extended period, its members enjoy a rare chance to strengthen their credentials and persuade both the Assembly of Experts and the Iranian public that they deserve the top job. President Masoud Pezeshkian, though among the most powerful figures in the country, does not qualify: he is not a cleric. That narrows the field on the council to two men, Ayatollah Alireza Arafi and Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje'i. Arafi is, in essence, a bureaucrat whose entire career, according to the Middle East Institute, was shaped by appointments Khamenei entrusted to him. From 2008 to 2018 he served as president of Al-Mustafa International University, founded by Khamenei to export the regime's ideology abroad. A rapid sequence of promotions followed: in 2016 he became head of all seminaries nationwide, in 2019 he was handpicked for the Guardian Council, and in 2022 he joined the Assembly of Experts. The Indian outlet The Week described him as a tech-savvy, second-generation hardliner with the right family connections. His appointment, perhaps more than any other candidate's, would signal pure continuity with Khamenei's system. Mohseni-Eje'i is more complicated. He studied at the Haqqani School in Qom, a seminary renowned for producing many of Iran's leading hardline clerics, and one of his teachers was Mesbah Yazdi, the same ultra-conservative theologian who mentored Mirbagheri. His career has been defined by a willingness to use violence in defense of the regime. Yet according to Iran International, since becoming chief justice in 2021 he has gradually distanced himself from Tehran's ultra-hardliners and cultivated a relatively cooperative relationship with Pezeshkian's moderate administration, drawing sharp criticism from purists who view him as going soft. If chosen, he would signal a regime prepared to be pragmatic in the name of survival. ## The Larijani Brothers and the De Facto Question Even with this roster of contenders, the man who ends up wielding the most power in Iran could be a dark horse. The CIA assessment that flagged a possible IRGC successor reportedly identified another candidate: Ali Larijani, a former commander in the Revolutionary Guards Corps and the current head of the Supreme National Security Council. According to the New York Times, Larijani has effectively been running Iran since the January protests. He directed the lethal crackdown on demonstrators demanding an end to Islamic rule. His portfolio extended further: suppressing dissent, including the arrest of prominent reformist politicians; managing relationships with powerful allies like Russia and regional players like Qatar and Oman; and overseeing nuclear negotiations with Washington. The Times reported he was also drawing up plans to manage Iran through a potential war with the United States, a role that had effectively sidelined President Pezeshkian. In the aftermath of the strikes, Larijani has been among the most visible figures, appearing on state television within hours of Khamenei's confirmed death with a fiery message: "We will burn their hearts. We will make … the shameless Americans regret their actions." The powers Larijani holds make him almost a de facto Supreme Leader. But "de facto" is likely where it stays, because he is not a cleric, and the constitution requires that the leader be one. The document has been amended before to suit political realities, yet stripping out the clerical requirement would be a bridge too far for a regime whose entire legitimacy rests on the principle of clerical rule. That is where his brother enters the picture. Sadiq Larijani is a cleric with deep government experience, currently serving as chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council and previously as chief justice. A former close aide to Khamenei, he has long been viewed as a potential successor. According to United Against Nuclear Iran, corruption allegations that trailed the end of his judicial career, together with the broader marginalization of the Larijani dynasty, have dented his standing. Even so, the fact that his brother climbed to one of the country's most powerful posts despite that marginalization suggests Sadiq's elevation is not unthinkable. A Sadiq appointment would produce an unusual complementarity. Sadiq would supply the clerical credentials, while Ali would bring the security-apparatus connections, the pragmatic diplomatic experience, and the relationships with Russia and China that Tehran badly needs as it confronts Washington and Jerusalem. In effect, it would formalize an arrangement that has existed since January, when Ali Larijani began running the country in all but name. Still, all of this is prediction. No one yet knows who will emerge victorious, and the winner could just as easily be someone not yet on anyone's list. Iran is in flux, and with thousands dead from the January protests and the country reeling from American and Israeli strikes, it remains an open question whether the regime survives at all. ## Regime Survival in a Time of War Whoever inherits the mantle of Supreme Leader faces an unenviable task. They must lead the country through a war with Israel and the United States while carrying a target on their back. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently insisted this is not a regime-change war, a claim complicated by the fact that the operation killed the man running the regime. President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, by contrast, have made their goal plain: during the announcement of the strikes, they urged the Iranian people to take control of their government. If regime change remains the objective, any new Supreme Leader could find himself in American crosshairs sooner rather than later. There is also the possibility that ordinary Iranians act on that encouragement and attempt to topple the government themselves. What makes this plausible is the public reaction to Khamenei's death. Despite Tehran's efforts to discourage open celebration, residents across multiple cities reportedly took to the streets in jubilation. Sources told Iran International that people were shouting in celebration. Farzad, a Tehran resident, described whistling and the honking of motorcycles and cars filling the air: "It just erupted all at once." Tehran is the city where state surveillance is strongest. If people are willing to celebrate that openly in the capital, the scenes in cities with weaker government control may be even more striking. Public celebration, however, is not necessarily fatal to the regime. As Rockford Weitz, a professor at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, observed in an interview with HomeFronts, roughly 40 percent of the nation still supports the system. Thousands turned out to mourn the Ayatollah not only in Tehran but in cities including Shiraz, Yasuj, and Lorestan. Seizing on those numbers, the government declared 40 days of mourning, a move analysts at Open Magazine called a "funeral trap" designed to make it logistically and morally difficult for anti-government protests to build momentum in the near term. The dangers are not only from the street. Whoever is chosen will likely face assassination attempts if he is seen offering too many concessions to the West. Hardliners within the Revolutionary Guards and the clerical establishment would treat such moves as betrayal, given that the regime has built its identity on resistance to America and Israel. And yet the next Supreme Leader will almost certainly have to strike some deal with Washington if the regime is to endure. Iran can exact a serious toll on American bases and allies across the Middle East, but it cannot withstand the combined might of the United States and Israel indefinitely. The successor, whoever he turns out to be, will be squeezed between the hardliners who demand defiance and the strategic reality that makes defiance unsustainable. ## Frequently Asked Questions **What happens to Iran's leadership immediately after the Supreme Leader's death?** Under the constitution, when the Supreme Leader cannot perform his functions, power passes to an interim leadership council. That council now consists of President Masoud Pezeshkian, judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje'i, and senior cleric Alireza Arafi, who will govern until a successor is chosen. **Who formally selects the next Supreme Leader?** The choice falls to the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member clerical body elected by the public every eight years. The complication is that convening the assembly during an active war is dangerous, because a gathering of the regime's senior clergy would be an obvious target for the United States and Israel. **Why can't President Pezeshkian become Supreme Leader?** Although Pezeshkian is one of the most powerful figures in the country and sits on the interim council, he is not a cleric. The constitution requires the Supreme Leader to be a cleric, which disqualifies him from the role. **Why is Ali Larijani considered so powerful if he can't become Supreme Leader?** As head of the Supreme National Security Council, Larijani has effectively run Iran since the January protests, overseeing the crackdown on dissent, relations with Russia and other allies, and nuclear negotiations with Washington. His authority makes him a de facto leader, but because he is not a cleric, he cannot formally take the title. His brother Sadiq, a cleric, could provide the clerical credentials in a complementary arrangement. **What is the significance of candidates not holding the title of Ayatollah?** Several contenders, including Mojtaba Khamenei and Hassan Khomeini, are mid-ranking clerics who have not attained the rank of Ayatollah. Their detractors are expected to use that against them, since the position of Supreme Leader carries immense theological weight and rivals will question the religious standing of anyone short of that rank. **How has the Iranian public reacted to Khamenei's death?** Reports from multiple cities described open celebration despite government efforts to discourage it, with residents in Tehran shouting, whistling, and honking horns. At the same time, roughly 40 percent of the nation still supports the regime, and thousands mourned the Ayatollah in cities such as Shiraz, Yasuj, and Lorestan. **Could the regime collapse altogether?** It is an open question. The country is reeling from American and Israeli strikes and thousands of deaths from the January protests, and Trump and Netanyahu have openly called for the people to overthrow the government. Still, the regime retains substantial support and has tools, such as the 40-day mourning period, to blunt unrest, so survival remains plausible even amid the crisis. ## Sources - [The Conversation: Trump and Netanyahu want regime change, but Iran's regime was built for survival](https://theconversation.com/trump-and-netanyahu-want-regime-change-but-irans-regime-was-built-for-survival-a-long-war-is-now-likely-277193) - [CNN: Pete Hegseth on the Pentagon and Iran strikes](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/02/world/video/pete-hegseth-pentagon-iran-strikes-digvid) - [Archive: archive.is/JMSQP](https://archive.is/JMSQP) - [Open Magazine: The funeral trap — how Iran is weaponising 40 days of mourning](https://openthemagazine.com/world/the-funeral-trap-how-iran-is-weaponising-40-days-of-mourning) - [Iran International](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602288551) - [Al Jazeera: Iran begins 40-day mourning after Khamenei killed in US-Israeli attack](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/1/iran-begins-40-day-mourning-after-khamenei-killed-in-us-israeli-attack) - [Archive: archive.is/pIefY](https://archive.is/pIefY) - [Washington Post: Iran, Israel, US war — Khamenei successor and the supreme leader question](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2026/03/02/iran-israel-us-war-khamenei-successor-supreme-leader/d4c9e20e-1644-11f1-aef0-0aac8e8e94db_story.html) - [The Hill: Larijani, Trump, and the Iran conflict](https://thehill.com/policy/international/5763740-larijani-trump-iran-conflict/) - [The Conversation: Despite massive US attack and death of Ayatollah, regime change in Iran is unlikely](https://theconversation.com/despite-massive-us-attack-and-death-of-ayatollah-regime-change-in-iran-is-unlikely-277180) <!-- youtube:dKYr7aTOqGc -->