Are Europe's Populist Parties Stumbling? The Limits of the Far-Right Surge

For the better part of the last few years, one message echoed across much of the media: Europe’s far right was on the rise, and its embrace of populist parties looked all but inevitable. The evidence seemed overwhelming. In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party, known by the Italian acronym FdI, surged from the margins of national politics to win power in 2022, then consolidated that position in the 2024 European Parliament elections with more than 28 percent of the vote.

The pattern repeated across the continent. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) doubled its support from 10.4 percent in 2021 to 20.8 percent in 2025, becoming the second-largest party in the Bundestag despite being classified as a potentially extremist movement by German intelligence. In the Netherlands, the Party for Freedom (PVV) won legislative elections in late 2023 and entered a coalition government the following year.

In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally expanded its vote share to over 29 percent during the 2024 legislative elections, taking 142 seats in the National Assembly to become the single largest party in parliament. And in the United Kingdom, Nigel Farage’s Reform UK won more than 14 percent of the vote in the July 2024 general election before climbing to the top of the polls.

Key Takeaways

After years of headline gains, Europe’s populist-right parties have suffered a string of setbacks across France, Slovenia, Portugal, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in recent months.
The gap between campaigning and governing has exposed the distance between populist slogans and the legal, bureaucratic and budgetary realities of holding office.
Falling energy prices and easing inflation have removed some of the urgency that drove voters toward populist alternatives, though a war with Iran threatens to reverse that relief.
Internal divisions, particularly over relations with Russia, have become a vulnerability for parties such as Germany’s AfD as they try to build a broader national profile.
A close alignment with Donald Trump, once seen as a tailwind, has become a liability as the US president grows deeply unpopular with European publics.
Personality-driven politics leaves these movements dangerously exposed when their figureheads stumble, since support rarely transfers to a successor.
The structural conditions behind the populist surge remain unresolved, meaning the current lull may prove temporary rather than permanent.

In short, Europe’s populist moment seemed as unstoppable as the sunrise. Yet today that sense of inevitability may finally be dissipating. The grievances that gave rise to the populist wave have not disappeared, but something has started to shift in recent months. The parties that were supposed to be marching toward long-term political power appear to be losing ground.

The question now is whether this is a mere stumble, or the start of a coming fall.

The Rise and Decline

Look at the headline elections from the last few months, and you would be forgiven for thinking that Europe’s populists might no longer be all that popular.

In France, centrist and left-leaning forces won mayoral and city council seats in Paris, Lyon and Marseille during the recent local elections, shutting out the National Rally in cities it had targeted. And while the National Rally did make gains in small towns and rural areas, it fell far short of its predicted level of support. In Slovenia, liberal Prime Minister Robert Golob’s Freedom Movement edged out the Trump-friendly Slovenian Democratic Party in a parliamentary vote. In Portugal, the Socialists walloped the nationalist Chega party in recent presidential elections.

In Italy, voters rejected Giorgia Meloni’s flagship judicial reforms in a constitutional referendum by a margin of roughly 54 percent to 46 percent, in what analysts widely described as a confidence test on her leadership. The result was a clear signal that even an established populist leader could not count on carrying the public with her on a defining issue.

And then there is the Netherlands, where the unravelling has been especially dramatic. Back in June 2025, the populist PVV collapsed its own coalition government after less than a year in power, pulling out over what party leader Geert Wilders described as insufficient progress on asylum restrictions. The snap election that followed in October saw the PVV lose 11 seats, tying with the social liberal D66 at 26 apiece. Then, in January 2026, seven PVV lawmakers quit the party to form their own faction, stripping Wilders of his status as the largest opposition force in parliament.

A Stunning Result in Gorton and Denton

Finally there is the United Kingdom, where February’s Gorton and Denton by-election stunned observers not just because of who won, but because of how overwhelming the result was.

Before the election, polling firm Opinium had released a poll showing that the right-wing Reform UK, the centre-left Labour Party and the left-wing Green Party were all locked in a dead heat, with the Greens and Labour polling at 28 percent and Reform at 27 percent. This was significant because the seat had been Labour territory for the better part of a century, and the fact that it was competitive at all was a testament to how much support Labour has lost under the uninspiring leadership of Keir Starmer.

Going in, much of the media was predicting another Runcorn, a reference to the Runcorn and Helsby by-election in 2025, when Labour had lost a seemingly safe seat to Reform by just six votes. Yet once the dust had settled in Gorton and Denton, the Greens had won the seat with more than 40 percent of the vote. While the real losers of the night were Labour, Reform UK’s distant second on 28 percent was itself a signal that right-wing populist momentum can stall.

Campaigning Versus Governing

Which raises an interesting question: why are Europe’s populist-right parties stalling? One possible reason is the gap between campaigning and governing.

Populist parties have been extremely effective at channelling voter grievances, but the transition to power tends to expose the distance between slogans and policy. In the Netherlands, the PVV won the 2023 election on the promise of the strictest asylum policy in Dutch history. In office, those promises ran into legal constraints, bureaucratic reality and coalition disagreements.

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In the United Kingdom, Reform has run into a similar problem. After the party took control of 12 councils in the May 2025 English local elections, Nigel Farage launched a cost-cutting initiative modelled on Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency in the United States. The UK version was supposed to send teams of analysts and auditors into Reform-run councils to slash wasteful spending. Instead, the unit visited just three councils and failed to scrutinise any internal finances because of legal barriers preventing unelected party officials from accessing sensitive data.

The situation was so dire that one councillor told The Observer, “It has all unravelled. They haven’t identified any waste.” What Reform councillors did identify were severe budgetary shortfalls that forced the party to go back on its promise to drop taxes, and instead increase them.

The Easing of Economic Pressure

A second factor in this dip in support for the populist right is the partial easing of economic pressure. The energy crisis that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was one of the most powerful accelerants of far-right support across Europe. Gas prices spiked past €300 per megawatt hour at the peak of the crisis, feeding inflation, straining household budgets and deepening the sense that governments had failed.

By 2025 and into 2026, prices had come down considerably. According to the European Commission, average wholesale gas prices stood at around €35 per megawatt hour in the second quarter of 2025. This was still 10 percent higher than in the same period in 2024, but 24 percent down on the previous quarter, indicating that lower prices were ahead. Inflation also dropped significantly across the continent, with Reuters reporting that it had fallen faster than expected in some of the euro zone’s biggest economies, while economic growth held up.

Euronews reported that prices had largely stabilised by late February 2026.

While the stabilisation had not erased the damage done to household budgets, it had removed some of the urgency that drove voters toward populist alternatives. Crucially, though, this stabilisation happened before the Iran war began. If the war and its impacts persist, it is possible that people will once again turn to the populist right looking for alternatives, though some of those parties, such as in the Czech Republic, are now the ones running the country and may have to absorb any voter backlash themselves.

Infighting and the Russia Question

Away from economics, a third reason the populist right is on the decline is infighting, and for the premier example we can turn to Germany’s AfD. According to the Robert Lansing Institute, the main cause of division in the AfD is the party’s relationship with Russia.

In November 2025, several AfD figures, including Bundestag members Steffen Kotré and Rainer Rothfuss, Saxony state leader Jörg Urban and MEP Hans Neuhoff, planned to attend a BRICS symposium in Sochi organised with backing from Russia’s ruling United Russia party. The planned trip triggered an open clash between the party’s co-chairs, Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla. Weidel condemned the visit, saying she could not understand what the delegates were supposed to do there, and threatened disciplinary measures including expulsion.

Chrupalla, on the other hand, argued that German politicians must maintain dialogue with Russia and said he saw no current threat from Moscow. He went further, suggesting that NATO ally Poland could also be a danger to Germany, prompting sharp pushback from within his own party. The split reflects a structural tension between the AfD’s eastern base, where pro-Russian sentiment is stronger, and its western wing, which has been trying to improve its public image. The Robert Lansing Institute argued that these ties with Russia had become a vulnerability in the party’s quest to build a larger national profile.

Nor is the AfD alone in having an awkward relationship with Russia. One of the parties making up Meloni’s coalition in Italy, the League, has chafed against her pro-NATO turn in office. In the Czech Republic, the largest party in the ruling coalition, ANO, is having to balance a base finely divided between people who like NATO and those who see modern-day Russia as the fulfilment of all their Communist-era nostalgia.

The Centre Co-opts the Populist Playbook

Another factor is the co-option of populist issues by mainstream parties. Across Europe, centrist and centre-right governments have adopted tougher positions on migration, borders and national security, effectively absorbing some of the ground that populist parties had claimed as their own.

In the Netherlands, centrist and leftist rivals promised faster deportations, blunting Wilders’ dominance on immigration even as they refused to work with him in coalition. In Germany, Friedrich Merz’s CDU has shifted markedly to the right on immigration policy. In France, Emmanuel Macron’s government has pushed through stricter asylum legislation. While this does not eliminate far-right parties, it narrows the space they can occupy.

Denmark’s recent elections perhaps show the limits of this approach. After becoming an international star for outflanking the right on immigration, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen saw her centre-left Social Democrats tumble this year to their worst election result since 1903. Although still the favourite to form the next government, her reputation has definitely taken a battering, a reminder that adopting populist positions carries its own risks for the parties that try it.

The Vulnerability of Personality Politics

The final issue at play is the vulnerability that comes with personality-driven politics. Populism in Europe today is heavily built around individual leaders: Wilders, Meloni, Le Pen, Weidel, Farage. Their personal appeal can be a powerful asset in campaigns, but it also creates a kind of dependence that leaves the movement exposed.

When Wilders collapsed his own coalition, it was his credibility as a governing partner that took the hit. When Meloni staked her reputation on the judicial referendum, the defeat landed on her personally. These losses would be a lot less damaging in a party with deeper institutional roots, because the leader responsible can easily resign and be replaced with someone else. That cannot happen in a personality cult, because the support will not transfer to the new leader.

This fragility is one of the clearest structural weaknesses of the current populist wave. Movements built on the charisma of a single figure rise quickly, but they have little to fall back on when that figure falters. And speaking of populist-right leaders who totally dominate their party, it is time to introduce the big, orange elephant in the room.

An American Albatross

When Donald Trump won the 2024 presidential election, it was treated across much of Europe’s populist right as a validation. His return to the White House promised ideological reinforcement, transatlantic legitimacy and, in some cases, direct support.

In February 2025, Vice President JD Vance used the Munich Security Conference to publicly meet with AfD leader Alice Weidel and endorse her party days before the German federal election. Elon Musk, at the time an adviser to President Trump, went even further, hosting Weidel for a livestream on X and openly urging people to vote for her, declaring that “Only AfD can save Germany.” In December 2025, the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy formally identified the promotion of right-wing nationalist parties in Europe as a component of American foreign policy.

The Globe and Mail reported that helping to elect more far-right legislators across Europe would remain a top administration priority, especially in France, which Washington viewed as a political linchpin. And in early 2026, the Financial Times reported that the State Department was preparing to channel grants to MAGA-aligned think tanks and charities across Europe, drawing from funds linked to America’s 250th birthday celebrations.

When the Tailwind Became a Liability

But what was supposed to be a tailwind for Europe’s hard right has increasingly become a liability. A series of moves by the Trump administration over the past year have alienated European publics so thoroughly that proximity to Washington is today about as likely to win you friends as proudly displaying an old photo of yourself partying with a notorious convict.

JD Vance’s Munich speech devolved into an ill-tempered lecture on how Europe should not fear Russia or China, but rather the dangers caused by its own policies on speech and migration. Max Bergmann, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, called it an extremely confrontational speech meant to influence European politics. Then came Trump’s repeated threats to acquire Greenland, followed by tariffs on European goods that hit key industries across the continent.

All this had already given the continent a dim view of the president. YouGov found that only 11 percent of Germans held a favourable view of Trump. He was equally unpopular elsewhere, with only 16 percent of Britons, 15 percent of Italians and 4 percent of Danes viewing him favourably. A now-infamous Politico poll earlier this year found that more voters in Germany, France, Britain and Canada felt it was better to depend on China than the United States under Trump.

The War With Iran

And then came the war with Iran. The war, which has now entered its second month, has placed enormous strain on Washington’s relationship with Europe. Trump has repeatedly voiced frustration over Western allies’ lack of support and reluctance to commit forces to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for the global maritime industry that has been effectively shut down by Iran.

Trump has reserved some of his harshest language for NATO, calling the other members cowards and declaring the alliance a paper tiger without the United States. He went one step further, posting on Truth Social that the US needed nothing from NATO. From the European perspective, the feeling has been that Trump started a war he cannot win, without informing allies, and is now expecting the continent not just to bear the consequences but also to help him fight, and possibly sacrifice their own troops in the process. That is not a position that has endeared Trump to Europe’s public.

For the continent’s populist-right parties, which had invested heavily in cultivating relationships with the Trump administration and presenting themselves as Washington’s natural partners, this has created an uncomfortable bind. Supporting Trump now means supporting a war that is driving up energy costs for European consumers, and a president who is not only deeply unpopular but has also openly threatened European allies over their refusal to participate. Distancing themselves from Trump means breaking with the ideological alliance that gave many of these parties international credibility in the first place.

Reverting to Anti-Americanism

This bind has led some, such as the AfD’s Tino Chrupalla, to revert to the default anti-Americanism that was once a hallmark of Europe’s nationalist parties. Speaking at a party gathering in Saxony, Chrupalla called for the withdrawal of all American troops and nuclear weapons from Germany, framing it as a step toward an independent foreign policy. He also praised Spain’s socialist government for blocking Washington from using its military bases for operations against Iran.

Germany’s Ramstein Air Base is currently being used by US forces as a hub to coordinate drone and missile strikes against Iran, and opposition politicians have warned that this could make the country a target for retaliation. Chrupalla’s stance is not new. The AfD’s party platform has long called for the removal of allied forces and nuclear weapons from German soil.

However, given Chrupalla’s well-documented sympathies toward Moscow, including defending Vladimir Putin on German television, there is a serious question over whether this latest call to remove American soldiers and weapons from German territory is a genuine reaction to the war, or an attempt to weaken NATO’s presence in Europe on Moscow’s behalf. Regardless of the reason, the fact that the removal of American troops from Germany is being seriously discussed is a testament to how dramatically the relationship between the American right and the European right has changed. Trump’s presidency, which was supposed to accelerate the European right’s march to power, has instead forced these parties into a difficult position where they must make tough choices or risk alienating the broader European public.

Greatly Exaggerated

It would be a mistake, however, to read too much into these results as proof that the European far right is in retreat. A closer look at the French local elections reveals a more complicated picture than the headline losses in Paris, Lyon and Marseille might suggest. While Le Pen’s National Rally failed to break through in France’s largest cities, it significantly expanded its territorial footprint in smaller and mid-sized municipalities.

Gabor Scheiring, an assistant professor at Georgetown University in Qatar, told Al Jazeera that the far right did not collapse but seems to have hit a ceiling in major cities while expanding its base elsewhere. In Slovenia, the liberal victory was secured only by the smallest of margins. Prime Minister Robert Golob defeated his right-wing rival, Janez Janša, by just 29 seats to 28, which, while still a victory, has resulted in a weakened left-leaning bloc in parliament and set the stage for difficult coalition negotiations.

And in Italy, while the referendum result was widely seen as a rebuke of Meloni and is expected to weaken her heading into next year’s general election, the fact that 46.5 percent of the nation voted for it indicates she still has a significant base of support. More importantly, it is a sign that the populist right might be here to stay.

The Illiberal Pendulum

The structural conditions that fuelled the right’s rise have not disappeared. Economic stagnation, declining real wages, and housing costs that are making it near impossible for younger generations to own a home all remain unresolved. More importantly, none of the centrist or left-leaning governments that won these recent elections seem to have a credible plan to permanently fix them. And there is no easy fix, especially when the issues go back decades and the global economy faces the risk of a recession because of the war in Iran.

If these governments do not try, however, they risk allowing the right to consolidate its position and achieve even more power in the next electoral cycle. Scheiring described what he called an illiberal pendulum in which the far right surges, falters, and allows the political centre to regain ground temporarily. But if the centre simply governs under the banner of “we’re not the far right” without addressing the structural problems that drove voters to these parties in the first place, the cycle repeats. The pendulum swings back, and the next wave comes with more institutional knowledge, deeper local roots, and a broader base than the last.

That is what makes the current moment so precarious. While the populist right is losing some battles, it is clearly gearing up for a long war. And the parties that are beating it right now have yet to demonstrate that they can do more than hold the line. For anyone who believes in the liberal democratic order, that is not a comforting thought.

Presented by

Simon Whistler

Simon Whistler is one of YouTube's most prolific educational creators. HomeFronts is his deep dive into geopolitics, modern conflict, military history, and the civilian and societal dimensions of global events.

Frequently Asked Questions

Are Europe’s populist-right parties actually in decline? They have suffered a clear run of setbacks. Centrist and left-leaning forces won French city elections, the PVV collapsed and shrank in the Netherlands, Italian voters rejected Meloni’s judicial reforms, and Reform UK underperformed in the Gorton and Denton by-election. But analysts caution against reading this as a retreat. The National Rally expanded in smaller French towns, Slovenia’s liberal win was razor-thin, and 46.5 percent of Italians still backed Meloni’s referendum, suggesting the lull may be temporary.

Why are these parties struggling to govern after winning elections? The transition from campaigning to governing exposes the gap between slogans and policy. The PVV won on a promise of the strictest asylum policy in Dutch history but ran into legal constraints, bureaucratic reality and coalition disagreements. In the UK, Reform’s Musk-inspired cost-cutting unit visited just three councils, identified no waste because of legal barriers, and ended up raising taxes after discovering budget shortfalls.

How has the energy situation affected populist support? The energy crisis after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with gas spiking past €300 per megawatt hour, was a powerful accelerant of far-right support. By the second quarter of 2025, wholesale gas had fallen to around €35 per megawatt hour, inflation dropped, and prices largely stabilised by late February 2026. That eased the urgency driving voters toward populists, though the Iran war could reverse the relief.

What role has Donald Trump played in the populist right’s troubles? Trump’s 2024 victory was initially seen as validation, with JD Vance endorsing the AfD at Munich and the administration making support for European nationalist parties official policy. But threats to acquire Greenland, tariffs on European goods, and a war with Iran have made him deeply unpopular. Only 11 percent of Germans and 4 percent of Danes view him favourably, turning the alliance into a liability.

Why is the AfD so divided over Russia? The party’s eastern base holds stronger pro-Russian sentiment, while its western wing has tried to improve its public image. A planned November 2025 trip by AfD figures to a BRICS symposium in Sochi triggered an open clash between co-chairs Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla, with Weidel threatening expulsion and Chrupalla insisting Germany maintain dialogue with Moscow.

How does personality-driven politics make these movements fragile? Populism in Europe is heavily built around individual leaders such as Wilders, Meloni, Le Pen, Weidel and Farage. When Wilders collapsed his coalition or Meloni lost her referendum, the damage landed on them personally. In a party with deeper institutional roots, a failing leader can resign and be replaced; in a personality cult, the support does not transfer to a successor.

Could the populist right come back stronger? Yes. The structural drivers of its rise, including economic stagnation, declining real wages and unaffordable housing, remain unresolved, and centrist governments have shown no credible plan to fix them. Scheiring describes an illiberal pendulum: if the centre governs only on the message of not being the far right, the next populist wave returns with more institutional knowledge, deeper local roots and a broader base.